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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Frank Lauria and two railyard co-workers were 
traversing the railroad tracks near Philadelphia's 30th 
Street Station late one evening when Lauria slipped and 
injured himself. He sued his employer, Appellee National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. S 51, et seq., 
("FELA"), claiming a workplace injury caused by Amtrak's 
failure to provide a reasonably safe work environment. At 
trial, the district court refused to permit the admission of 
expert and lay opinion testimony, and at the close of 
Lauria's case it entered a judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of Amtrak. We have jurisdiction over the district 
court's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we will 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 
I. 
 
On November 8, 1993, Lauria slipped while crossing the 
tracks at Amtrak's Penn Coach Yard in Philadelphia with 
two co-workers, Campbell Smith, an engineer, and Carl 
Boselli, a conductor. Lauria testified that because they were 
crossing a "dark" railyard with "poor" lighting conditions, 
he was trying to step on the ballast, the coarse gravel that 
is used to form the bed of the railroad, rather than on the 
rail ties themselves, because it provides stable footing and 
support between the tracks. However, Lauria lost his 
balance and fell on Track 26 while trying to step over the 
ties. He stated under oath that he raised his left foot, lifted 
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it over the rail, and set it firmly on the ballast. He then 
lifted his right foot, but he slipped when trying to place that 
foot down on the ballast, and he fell to the ground, 
developing sharp pains in his right leg and lower back 
before losing consciousness. Lauria admitted that he never 
saw what caused the fall, but he testified that he had 
stepped on "something slippery," rather than on the ballast 
that is usually found between the two rail ties on the 
tracks. 
 
Boselli testified that he was standing an "arm's length" 
from Lauria when the accident occurred. Boselli saw Lauria 
fall, heard him "smack" onto the ground, and felt "baffled" 
because Lauria "fell violently." Immediately after the 
accident, Boselli looked down and saw a "fresh" skid mark 
on the surface of a piece of wood that was lying inside the 
gauge of the track where the ballast providing stable footing 
would normally be found. The wood was in the exact area 
where Lauria had slipped, and the skid mark was at the 
precise spot where the fall had occurred. Boselli also 
noticed that the lighting conditions were "poor," because 
the overhead lights did not sufficiently illuminate the area 
where Lauria fell, and because the trains "were blocking the 
passage of what lights did exist." 
 
Lauria attempted to offer Robert T. Slavin, a track 
foreman and maintenance engineer, to support his case as 
an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
Slavin was prepared to testify that Amtrak's negligence in 
failing to remove a piece of wood from the tracks had 
contributed to and caused Lauria's injuries. However, the 
district court found that Slavin was not sufficiently 
qualified as an expert on track maintenance operations, 
and it refused to allow him to render an opinion. The court 
also rejected Lauria's effort to introduce Slavin as a lay 
witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701. As a 
result, Lauria sought to recall Boselli as a lay opinion 
witness to testify about the condition of the tracks on the 
morning after the accident. Once again, though, the district 
court denied Lauria's request under Rule 701 and 
precluded the witness from testifying. Amtrak then moved 
for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a), arguing that without the testimony of 
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Slavin and Boselli, Lauria had presented no evidence that 
Amtrak's negligence had contributed to his injuries. The 
district court agreed, and on March 27, 1997, it dismissed 
Lauria's claims and entered judgment in favor of Amtrak at 
the close of Lauria's case. 
 
Lauria contends on appeal that the district court abused 
its discretion in excluding the testimony of Slavin and 
Boselli and erred in entering a judgment in Amtrak's favor.1 
We need not reach the issue of the correctness of the 
district court's ruling on the motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, because we conclude that Lauria's failure to 
produce evidence of negligence resulted from the improper 
exclusion of testimony from Slavin and Boselli that was 
clearly admissible.2 Therefore, we will reverse and remand 
for a new trial at which Slavin and Boselli may testify on 
Lauria's behalf. 
 
II. 
 
The district court incorrectly prohibited Slavin from 
testifying as an expert witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We review the district court's decisions to exclude expert testimony 
under Rule 702, and to exclude lay opinion testimony under Rule 701, 
for abuse of discretion. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 
829, 856 n.33 (3d Cir. 1990) (expert testimony); Government of the V.I. 
v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1993) (lay opinion testimony). 
 
2. Although we need not decide the propriety of the court's judgment as 
a matter of law based on the evidence before it, we note that it is a 
close 
question given the minimal proof required to withstand a directed verdict 
in FELA cases combined with Lauria's evidence as to poor lighting in the 
railyard. See Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 430 F.2d 697, 
699-700 (3d Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (holding 
that a "trial court is justified in withdrawing[FELA] issues from the 
jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances where there 
is a zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such 
negligence contributed to the injury of an employee"). 
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form of an opinion or otherwise." The Rule therefore has 
three fundamental requirements: (1) the proffered witness 
must qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education; (2) the expert must testif y to 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; and 
(3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier o f fact. 
United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Here, the district court appears to have excluded Slavin's 
testimony based on the first two elements of the test, 
evincing skepticism as to both the extent of Slavin's 
qualifications and as to whether he possessed specialized 
knowledge.3 
 
Lauria offered Slavin as an expert in track maintenance 
based on his experience and education in "Maintenance of 
Way" and related train procedures. Slavin's expert report 
contained his opinion that, from an examination of photos 
and the site, the piece of wood in question was a"base tie" 
over which a walkway platform once existed; that it should 
have been discovered by Amtrak during a regular 
inspection and removed; and that it "contributed to and 
caused" Lauria's injuries.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court's colloquy with Slavin, set forth below, could be 
interpreted as questioning either the first element of the Rule -- whether 
Slavin qualified as an expert by virtue of his special knowledge -- or 
both of the Rule's first two prongs -- his experience and the nature and 
extent of his knowledge regarding track maintenance. We will construe 
it based on the latter, believing that to be the approach most consistent 
with the nature of the court's inquiry. 
 
4. At oral argument Amtrak argued that the district court properly 
excluded Slavin's testimony, because Slavin could not testify as to 
causation since he was not an expert in accident reconstruction. 
However, this argument misconstrues the district court's ruling, which 
never reached this issue, but focused instead on the extent of his 
"specialized knowledge" as it relates to qualifying him to be an expert 
witness. No mention was made of the last sentence of Slavin's report 
regarding his stated view that Amtrak's failure"to provide a reasonably 
safe place in which to perform his duties contributed to and caused 
Lauria's injury." We thus focus only on Slavin's qualifications and 
specialized knowledge in the area of industry standards for track 
maintenance. It will be for the district court to examine whether Slavin 
is qualified to speak to the issue of causation if Amtrak makes this 
objection at a new trial. 
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Lauria proffered evidence as to the extent of Slavin's 
experience in railroad track operations. Slavin had worked 
for Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") from 1976 to 
1993, where he was hired as a trackman and then 
promoted to machine operator, assistant supervisor, and, in 
1981, to supervisor of railroad tracks. As a supervisor, 
Slavin assumed ultimate responsibility for conditions on a 
200-300 mile stretch of track located in Indiana. Among 
other things, he oversaw maintenance of the track 
structure, installation of the rail ties, and rehabilitation of 
all switches, and he was responsible for records, 
chargeouts, and safe maintenance of the area. Slavin also 
successfully completed training programs for track 
foremen, maintenance and way engineers, equipment 
operators, and supervisors during his seventeen-year 
tenure at Conrail. In addition, he had been self-employed 
as a railroad track safety consultant since 1993. 
 
In pretrial proceedings, the district court had denied 
Amtrak's motion in limine to exclude Slavin's testimony. 
See Lauria v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. Civ. A. 
95-1561, 1997 WL 138906, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 
1997). However, after listening to the voir dire, and asking 
its own questions, the district court rejected Lauria's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We note, however, that counsel for Lauria stated at oral argument that 
Slavin's work in accident reconstruction over the last five years did 
provide a basis for his expert status on causation, and that a number of 
federal courts have permitted experts qualified because of their 
specialized knowledge to testify as to the cause of railroad accidents. 
See, 
e.g., Lowery v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. , 891 F.2d 1187, 1194 & n.3 
(5th Cir. 1990) (witness with ten years experience as train master, 
operating rules examiner, manager of railroad car repair, and inspector 
of railroad equipment was qualified as an expert on whether hand brake 
operations could cause personal injuries); Fritts v. Toledo Terminal R.R. 
Co., 293 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1961) (engineer with forty years of 
railroad experience could testify that worn frogs, or railroad track 
devices, caused a train to lurch, because "[q]ualified persons as 
experienced railroad employees may testify and express opinions on 
matters of this type"); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Simmons, 
153 F.2d 206, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1946) (locomotive engineers with 
experience operating trains qualified as experts to testify as to whether 
the presence of caliche rock caused a train derailment). 
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request to introduce Slavin at trial as a qualified expert on 
track maintenance.5 The court's examination of Slavin 
proceeded in relevant part as follows: 
 
The Court: Now the first question, do you consider yourself 
       qualified by reason of your scientific 
       education? Do you feel yourself qualified to 
       testify as an expert based on your technical 
       knowledge by reason of education or 
       experience and if so would you be specific as to 
       what you think that is? Technical knowledge. 
 
Slavin: I believe so with the hands-on experience that I've 
       had over the years working with track and track 
       equipment and maintenance and production, yes, 
       I -- 
 
The Court: You consider that to be your specialized 
       knowledge? 
 
Slavin: Yes. 
 
The Court: And what separates you from other persons 
       who have worked for twenty years on the 
       railroad? Would all of those . . . ladies or 
       gentlemen who have had the same experience 
       -- work experience as you, in your mind, sir, 
       do you consider them to be persons who have 
       the type of technical or specialized knowledge 
       who can come into a court of law and give 
       answers to hypothetical questions like a doctor 
       does? 
 
Slavin: I believe so. 
 
The Court: And why is that? What is so unusual about 
       working the rails as you have over the years 
       which gives persons who had that experience 
       specialized knowledge of the type that would 
       enable them to offer an opinion, to 
       hypothecate? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), the trial judge decides the preliminary 
questions of whether the proposed expert is qualified and whether the 
testimony is admissible. 
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Slavin: I don't have an answer for that. 
 
The Court: And that's my dilemma. . . . I'm not qualifying 
       him as an expert. . . . I don't see any basis to 
       qualify him as an expert. 
 
We must exercise restraint in examining the district 
court's decision on appeal, because a "trial court's 
determination whether to admit or exclude expert testimony 
will be upheld unless manifestly erroneous." Waldorf v. 
Shuta, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 97 5195, 97-5222, 1998 WL 
173103, at *27 (3d Cir. Apr. 15, 1998) (quotation omitted). 
Nevertheless, we find that in light of Slavin's qualifications 
and the liberal standard for determining whether a witness 
qualifies as an expert for purposes of Rule 702, the district 
court did err in precluding Slavin from testifying. 6 
 
We have consistently maintained that Rule 702 is to be 
interpreted liberally. See, e.g., Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849; In 
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("Paoli I"). "[A] broad range of knowledge, skills, and 
training qualify an expert as such," and we have thus 
"eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of 
expertise and have been satisfied with more generalized 
qualifications." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 
741 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli II"). 
 
In fact, "it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 
simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed 
expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed 
expert does not have the specialization that the court 
considers most appropriate." Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. 
Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Paoli I, 916 
F.2d at 855 (writing that any "insistence on a certain kind 
of degree or background is inconsistent with our 
jurisprudence"). We have held that witnesses such as 
Slavin can qualify as experts under Rule 702 on the basis 
of practical experience alone, and a formal degree, title, or 
educational speciality is not required. American Tech. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we hold that Slavin should have been permitted to testify as 
an expert witness, we do not reach Lauria's contention that Slavin 
should have been permitted to testify alternatively as a lay witness 
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
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Resources v. United States, 893 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 
1990). For example, in Hammond v. Int'l Harvester Co., we 
held that a witness who sold agricultural equipment and 
taught automobile repair and maintenance at a high 
school, but who lacked any formal training or education, 
could testify as an expert in a products liability action 
involving tractors, based on his "knowledge and experience" 
alone. 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982). Similarly, we held 
recently that a witness could qualify as a vocational expert, 
despite a lack of formal training, because he had experience 
in vocational rehabilitation and familiarity with the relevant 
literature in his field. Waldorf, #6D6D 6D# F.3d ___, 1998 WL 
173103, at *27; see also United States v. Riccobene, 709 
F.2d 214, 230-31 (3d Cir. 1983) (concluding that an FBI 
agent qualified as an expert to define certain terms on 
undercover audiotapes because of his twelve years of 
practical experience in organized crime investigations), 
overruled on other grounds by Griffin v. United States, 502 
U.S. 46 (1991); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 702.06[4], at 702-39 (2d ed. 
1997) ("A person may qualify as an expert on the basis of 
skill or practical experience rather than education or 
training."). We conclude that Slavin's twenty years of 
experience with track equipment, maintenance, and safety 
procedures qualified him as an expert who could testify as 
to Amtrak's responsibility to inspect and maintain the track 
in a safe condition. 
 
Additionally, the knowledge forming the basis of Slavin's 
opinion was clearly "specialized." In evaluating this second 
element of Rule 702, we measure the reliability or 
trustworthiness of the expert's testimony. Velasquez, 64 
F.3d at 849. However, the "specialized" knowledge upon 
which Slavin's testimony is founded is not the same as 
"scientific" and "technical" knowledge, as these terms are 
used in the disjunctive in Rule 702. To be "specialized," 
knowledge can be based on sufficient practical or work 
experience in the field about which the witness is testifying, 
and it need not be based on testing or experiments beyond 
common understanding. Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory 
committee's note; Habecker v. Copperloy Corp. , 893 F.2d 
49, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1990). Therefore, we need only ask 
whether Lauria has shown that Slavin's testimony would be 
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reliable or trustworthy in light of Slavin's practical 
background and training.7 We conclude that given Slavin's 
twenty years of experience in track maintenance, 
operations, and safety, and given the nature of his opinion 
and the liberal standard by which we interpret reliability 
under Rule 702, Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849-50, Lauria has 
clearly met his burden to demonstrate that Slavin's 
testimony would be sufficiently reliable so as to be 
admissible. 
 
We also find that the third element under Rule 702, 
namely, that Slavin's testimony would assist the trier of 
fact, is clearly met. As the Supreme Court has written, this 
"condition goes primarily to relevance." Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). The proffered 
expert's testimony must "fit" under the facts of the case so 
that "it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d 
Cir. 1985)). Once again, however, the standard for this 
factor "is not that high," Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 745, and we 
find that it has been met in the case at bar. The primary 
issue here is whether Amtrak was negligent in failing to 
remove a base tie from Lauria's workplace. Slavin was the 
only witness originally presented to testify that the tie was 
a dangerous obstruction that should have been discovered 
and removed, and was the only such witness who would 
have asserted that Amtrak's negligence made the workplace 
unsafe. There is, therefore, a clear "fit" connecting the issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This case does not require us to test the reliability of Slavin's 
opinion 
with the factors outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). Whether Daubert even applies outside the scientific context 
remains in dispute. See, e.g., id. at 590 n.8 (noting that the opinion was 
"limited to the scientific context because that[was] the nature of the 
expertise" offered in the case); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 
991 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert is applicable to cases involving specialized 
knowledge); United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Daubert's standards "simply do not apply" to experts with specialized 
knowledge). We do not, however, need to resolve that controversy here. 
Because Slavin's opinion is based on his observations and familiarity 
with "Maintenance of Way Procedures" and is gleaned from years of 
practical experience, the discipline in this case is so different from a 
scientific inquiry that we see no need to engage in a detailed analysis 
regarding the scientific reliability of the proffered opinion. 
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in the case with the expert's opinion, which will aid the jury 
in determining whether the defendant's conduct met the 
standard of care. Consequently, we conclude that Slavin 
should have been permitted to testify. 
 
Finally, we note that because Slavin was the only witness 
originally offered to prove Amtrak's negligence with respect 
to the base tie, his exclusion from the trial did not 
constitute harmless error. The exclusion of expert evidence 
will be upheld as harmless error only where it is"highly 
probable" that the error did not affect the judgment in the 
district court. Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 787. After reviewing 
Slavin's proffered testimony, as well as the basis for the 
district court's ruling, we cannot say that it is"highly 
probable" that the error in this case did not contribute to 
the entry of a judgment in Amtrak's favor. 
 
III. 
 
We also conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in rejecting Lauria's request to recall Boselli as a 
witness to render a lay opinion under Rule 701. Once the 
district court rebuffed Lauria's attempt to introduce Slavin 
as an expert witness, Lauria sought to have Boselli testify 
about the condition of the tracks as he perceived them on 
the morning after the accident. The record indicates that 
Boselli would have opined that Lauria slipped on an extra 
piece of wood that was located between the tracks in an 
area where train employees would ordinarily expect to find 
ballast. However, after discussing the matter with the 
parties, the district court concluded that Boselli could "add 
nothing more as a lay witness," and it denied Lauria's 
request to recall him to the stand because, in its view, 
Boselli had "no information to give to the jury which would 
in any way, shape, or form aid them in their determination 
regarding the location of the fall and what caused the fall." 
 
We disagree. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states: 
 
       If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
       testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
       limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
       (a) rationally based on the perception of the witn ess 
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       and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the wi tness' 
       testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
 
The district court did not view Boselli's proffered testimony 
as helpful to the determination of Amtrak's negligence, and 
it thus prohibited Boselli from testifying based on the 
language in Rule 701(b). Yet we believe that the standard 
for admissibility under that provision is liberal enough to 
allow Lauria to recall Boselli in support of his case-in-chief. 
 
We have noted concerning the admissibility of lay opinion 
testimony that the "modern trend favors the admission of 
opinion testimony, provided that it is well founded on 
personal knowledge and susceptible to specific cross- 
examination." Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 
399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980). Therefore, an opinion is"helpful" 
to the trier of fact within the meaning of Rule 701(b) if it 
aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise 
be as competent to understand. See United States v. Skeet, 
665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Opinions of non-experts 
may be admitted where the facts could not otherwise be 
adequately presented or described to the jury in such a way 
as to enable the jury to form an opinion or reach an 
intelligent conclusion.") As long as the "circumstances can 
be presented with greater clarity by stating an opinion, then 
that opinion is helpful to the trier of fact." Government of 
the V.I. v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Boselli's opinion that Lauria slipped on an extra piece of 
wood on the tracks easily satisfies these permissive 
standards. His testimony would have shown the existence 
of an unforseen obstruction in the exact location where 
Lauria fell, which, in turn, could have assisted the jury in 
determining whether the wood posed an unreasonable 
danger to railroad employees crossing the tracks. 
Regardless of what other evidence had been presented at 
trial, Boselli's statements would have informed the jury as 
to issues of track maintenance and safety encountered in 
the ordinary course, and would have identified a potential 
hazard that was central to Lauria's theory of negligence. 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Boselli lacked 
the experience or specialized knowledge needed to render 
an opinion on this issue. In this regard, the instant case 
differs materially from Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor 
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Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995), where we held 
that lay opinions on technical matters such as causation 
"must derive from a sufficiently qualified source as to be 
reliable and hence helpful to the jury." 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by 
prohibiting Lauria from recalling Boselli to the stand, 
because Boselli's lay opinion testimony certainly would 
have been "helpful" to the "determination of a fact in issue" 
within the meaning of Rule 701. Also, given the substance 
of Boselli's proffered testimony in the context of Lauria's 
case, we cannot conclude that the court's error in excluding 
Boselli's testimony was harmless. See Holbrook , 80 F.3d at 
787. 
 
IV. 
 
Amtrak has filed a cross-appeal challenging several of the 
district court's rulings, but we reject these contentions 
because we agree substantially with the reasoning of the 
district court. We will thus affirm the February 19, 1997, 
denial of Amtrak's renewed motion for summary judgment, 
the March 24, 1997, denial of Amtrak's motion in limine to 
exclude the testimony of John Mariani, D.O., I. David 
Weisband, D.O., and Robert T. Slavin, and the March 24, 
1997, grant of Lauria's motion in limine to exclude Slavin's 
personnel and medical records. 
 
V. 
 
The district court abused its discretion by excluding the 
testimony of Robert T. Slavin as an expert witness, and by 
prohibiting Lauria from recalling Carl Boselli to the stand 
as a lay opinion witness. Accordingly, the district court's 
Order dated March 27, 1997, will be reversed, and the 
cause will be remanded for a new trial consistent with this 
opinion. 
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